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Introduction 
In 1955, the year before its independence from the United Kingdom (UK), a 
civil war started in Sudan which lasted until 1972. Since 1983 Sudan has faced 
renewed conflict. The focus of international attention has long been the so-
called ‘North-South’ conflict, but since 2003 another region, Darfur, has 
emerged into the spotlights. After the signing of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) in Nairobi in January 2005 between the Government of 
Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), the 
United Nations (UN) has deployed the peacekeeping operation United Nations 
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). At present 8,827 troops, 583 military observers, 
696 police, 880 international civilian and 2,566 local civilian personnel, and 
253 United Nations Volunteers are working for UNMIS.1 The operation is 
mandated by Security Council resolution 1590 (2005) amongst other tasks to 
support the implementation of the CPA. It is allowed under chapter VII of the 
Charter ‘to take the necessary action’ to protect ‘civilians under imminent 
threat of physical violence’, and to protect its own personnel and humanitarian 
workers.2 
 
Security Council resolution 1706 (2006) mandated UNMIS to be deployed in 
Darfur in order to end the conflict in that region and assist in the 
implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and the N’djamena 
Agreement on Humanitarian Cease-fire on the Conflict in Darfur. The actual 
deployment of UNMIS in Darfur was, however, hampered by the fact that the 
GoS obstructed it. The Government preferred the continuation of the African 
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Subsequently, talks on Darfur in the Security 
Council went in the direction of a hybrid operation of AMIS combined with so-
called United Nations Light and Heavy Support Packages, and the deployment 
of a multi-dimensional presence in the border regions in the Central African 
Republic (CAR) and Chad to prevent a spill-over of the conflict into these two 
countries. On 31 July the Security Council approved the deployment of the 
African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). This 
was followed on 25 September by the approval of the United Nations Mission 
in the CAR and Chad (MINURCAT) and EUFOR Chad/CAR.3 
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The research questions and methodology 
The Dutch development organisation Cordaid commissioned this study and 
laid down a number of research questions on the chances for success and failure 
of UNMIS in the ‘North-South’ conflict and the lessons that can be drawn 
from the experiences in this conflict for conflict management in Darfur. These 
research questions are as follows: 
 
A) The peace process and peacekeeping operation in the ‘North-South’ conflict 
 
1. What are the most important developments in the peace process in the 
‘North-South’ conflict up to this moment? 
2. To what extent does UNMIS satisfy the factors for success and failure 
as found in research on UN-peacekeeping operations? 
3. Are there any case specific factors for success and failure, other factors 
which play an important and special role in Sudan? 
 
B The lessons from the peace process and the peacekeeping operation in the ‘North-
South’ conflict applied to the conflict in Darfur 
 
1 What are the most important developments in the peace process in the 
Darfur conflict up to this moment? 
2 How do the general factors for success and failure and the Sudan case 
specific factors for success and failure, as found under A3, determine 
the chances for success for the case of UNAMID in Darfur? 
3 Which recommendations follow from this analysis? 
 
The underlying methodology used in this study has been developed in: Jaïr van 
der Lijn, Walking the tightrope: Do UN peacekeeping operations actually contribute 
to durable peace? Amsterdam, Rozenberg Publishers, Dutch university Press, 
Purdue University Press, 2006. The present study is based on a study of 
literature and relevant documents, as well as on interviews with key-experts and 
stakeholders, such as academics and representatives from both Sudanese as 
international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), the conflict parties, 
the international community, international organizations and UNMIS. For this 
purpose a field research was undertaken from 24 October to 17 November in 
Khartoum and Juba (Sudan) and Addis Ababa (Ethiopia). The interviews 
during this research were held under the agreement that there would be no 
direct quotations and that references should not be traceable to persons 
directly. For these reasons the references have been clustered and the 
interviewees have been coded. More information on this can be obtained from 
the author. The research, its findings and the recommendations are those of the 
authors and can in no way be attributed to Cordaid.  
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Factors for success and failure of peacekeeping operations 
In order to assess the chances for success and failure of UNMIS and 
UNAMID, this study reviews both operations on the extent to which they fulfil 
nine factors of success and failure which explain the differences in the 
contribution of peacekeeping operations to durable peace. Durable peace is 
defined as absence of physical violence and the sufficient addressing of the 
causes of conflict.4 The probability that a peacekeeping operation makes a 
positive contribution to durable peace increases if: 
 
1. The parties are willing and sincere in cooperating with the implementation of the 
operation: In order for the conflicting parties to be sincere they need to 
perceive the operation as an important part of a peace process, which they 
view as the best alternative for the conflict. The reason for the required 
willingness and sincerity is that one can start building peace, but if the 
parties only hope to restart the conflict once the United Nations leaves, the 
results cannot be lasting. 
 
2. The operation is able to provide a sufficient sense of security to the parties: A 
short-term danger is lurking at the start of an operation, because although 
the parties may view the projected durable peace as the best alternative, the 
road towards that future will be perceived, and often is, a bumpy one. The 
conflict and the history of far before the conflict have often created a 
perception amongst the parties that the other party is not to be trusted and 
that one has to provide for one’s own security against the threat of the 
other. In order to stop this spiral and to enable disarmament and 
demobilisation, an operation needs to provide alternative sources for a sense 
of security. Parties generally perceive their security to increase if the cease-
fire is monitored by a credible, large, well-trained, well-equipped, and 
robustly mandated force.  
 
3. The operation has sufficient attention for the causes of the conflict both in depth 
and in breadth: One can perhaps reach negative peace, but if the causes of 
conflict persist, it is likely to eventually flair up again. The probability that 
an operation contributes sufficiently to the addressing of the causes of the 
conflict increases if more of these causes are addressed – the breadth – and 
if more attention is given to each cause – the depth. If not all causes receive 
sufficient attention, the chances increase that the conflict resumes, and the 
causes that were addressed intensify again and therefore undo the work that 
has already been done. In the short term, however, especially state 
unwillingness and the absence of good governance, and the absence of 
legitimacy of the state and government are generally important causes of 
conflict to be addressed. 
 
4. The operation receives sufficient co-operation from important outside actors and 
parties: In particular, the support of the permanent members of the Security 
Council is important, because they need to accept the necessary resolutions 
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and mandate, and may also need to pressure proxies into compliance. The 
co-operation from neighbouring countries is essential, because these 
countries often support one of the parties, and the implementation of some 
‘policy tools’ implemented in peacekeeping operation requires their 
assistance. 
 
5. The operation is timely deployed and at the right time: If the timing is right, 
peacekeeping operation can aid and play an accommodating role. If the 
conflict is not yet ripe, the role of an operation which is supposed to 
monitor a cease-fire on the basis of the consent of the parties, is much more 
limited. Furthermore, also timely deployment of an operation is important, 
because late deployment may allow stable situations to destabilize again. 
Therefore, the interval between the signing of a peace agreement and 
deployment of the operation needs to be kept to a minimum in order to 
maintain the momentum for peace.  
 
6. The operation has at its disposal competent personnel and leadership, as well as 
clear command structures: The leadership is especially important with regard 
to the continuing mediation role during the presence of an operation. 
Furthermore, competent personnel is the basis for each ‘policy tool’ in a 
peacekeeping operation. Clear command structures are especially important 
in crisis situations, but also support a fluent decision-making process. 
 
7. The operation is part of a long-term approach: In order to contribute 
sufficiently to negative peace and especially to the addressing of the causes 
of the conflict, time is needed. Consequently, it should not come as a 
surprise that many of these processes may be started by a peacekeeping 
operation, but cannot be finished within the period of its presence and 
therefore need to be embedded in a wider approach. This means that 
operations need to build upon policies that have already been applied. 
Furthermore, in the absence of sufficient follow-up, it is likely that the short 
period of presence is not enough to allow durable changes to take root and 
in such a situation the contribution of an operation is likely to be only 
temporary. 
 
8. Within the operation and externally the implementation of the ‘policy tools’ are 
coordinated: The implementation of many ‘policy tools’ within a 
peacekeeping operation depends on the implementation of other ‘policy 
tools’. Co-ordination between them is essential for optimum 
implementation. There are two main problems in this respect. First, 
important processes are sometimes rushed in order to be completed in time 
for another. Second, two complementary ‘policy tools’ fail to link up with 
each other, and consequently too much time may elapse between these two 
linked processes. External co-ordination is another important factor. Again 
there are two main problems. First, if all these actions are insufficiently co-
ordinated with other organisations present in the field, they may thwart 
each other. Second, lack of co-ordination with the organisation that is to 
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take over the task after departure of the operation, may badly affect the 
sustainability of the contribution. 
 
9. The operation provides ‘ownership’: ‘Ownership’ is important both during and 
after the presence of an operation. Parties, in the end, need to be enabled to 
decide for themselves what they together deem necessary, in order to ensure 
that an operation does deliver what they require it to. After the departure of 
an operation, the former conflicting parties and the population must view 
and feel the contribution to be something they want to maintain. 
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The peace process and peacekeeping 
operation in the ‘North-South’ conflict 
The most important developments in the peace process in the ‘North-
South’ conflict up to this moment 
In 1972 the First Civil War in Sudan came to an end with the signing of the 
Addis Ababa Agreement according to which the South of the country became 
autonomous. A decade of relative peace followed until in 1983 the Sudanese 
government wanted to install shari’a rule in the whole country and 
consequently restrain southern autonomy. A ferocious civil war followed. The 
immense complexity of the conflict and lack of political will prevented an early 
resolution. Under the guidance of the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) a negotiations process started between the GoS and the 
biggest armed opposition movement, the SPLM which in 2002 resulted in the 
signing of the Machakos protocol, in which a broad framework for peace was 
set out. A second protocol followed in Naivasha in 2003 and the four last 
protocols were signed in 2004. That same year the United Nations offered its 
support for the implementation of the Protocols, and the Security Council 
called for a political mission, the United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan 
(UNAMIS), to make an inventory of the operational realities in Sudan and to 
prepare for a possible peace support operation. The GoS quickly signed an 
agreement with the United Nations to facilitate UNAMIS, while the SPLM 
hesitated. The two conflict parties needed until the end of 2004 to resolve the 
outstanding security issues. On 9 January 2005, the CPA was signed.5 
 
The signing of the CPA did not mean the road ahead would be without 
obstacles. Other regional conflicts in Sudan, like the ones in Darfur and the 
east, remained, and these might affect the ‘North-South’ peace process. 
Tensions and internal divisions in the South, which had been suppressed in the 
fight against a common enemy, might become possible roadblocks. External 
forces, like the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), could also influence the peace 
process. Moreover, the so-called ‘other armed groups’ had not been dealt with 
in the negotiations, although they were supposed to be integrated in the two 
armies. Furthermore, the negotiations of the CPA depended on two key figures, 
SPLM leader John Garang and GoS Vice President Ali Osman Taha. The latter 
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was only able to sell the peace accord to his sceptical colleagues as the country’s 
last chance for unity, and as the path to ending Sudan’s international isolation.6 
 
The Security Council established UNMIS and authorized a maximum size of 
10,000 military personnel and an appropriate civilian component. The mandate 
of the mission consists of four broad components: support the implementation 
of the CPA; coordinate and facilitate the voluntary return of refugees and 
internally displaced persons (IDPs); assist the mine-action sector; and protect 
and promote human rights.7 
 
On 9 July President Omar Bashir, First-Vice President Garang and Vice-
President Taha were sworn-in leading the Government of National Unity 
(GoNU), the Interim National Constitution was signed and the state of 
emergency in all States except Darfur, Kassala State and Red Sea State was 
lifted. Nonetheless, only three weeks later the CPA was put to a severe test 
when Garang died in a helicopter crash in southern Sudan. In the days after his 
death the SPLM took swift action to confirm Salva Kiir as its new Chairman. 
Nonetheless, Garang’s death led to serious social unrest in amongst other 
places Khartoum, and to delays in the implementation of the CPA as the 
SPLM had to recuperate. At the same time with the death of Garang the star of 
vice-president Taha dimmed sharply. It became clear that few in the northern 
governing National Congress Party (NCP) believed in the spirit of the CPA and 
strong leadership to push it through was not available. In the meantime the 
deployment of UNMIS lagged behind schedule.8  
 
On 22 October the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) was established as 
a caretaker government, followed by an Interim Constitution at the start of 
December. At the end of that month also the status-of-force agreement between 
UNMIS and the GoNU was finally signed. Nonetheless, during this period a 
number of problems rose. First, the Abyei boundary issue was not resolved as 
the NCP rejected the report of the Abyei Boundary Commission. The oil-rich 
region of Abyei requires special attention, because it forms the bridge between 
the North and the South. Second, the ‘other armed groups’ had not yet signed 
the peace agreement, while the deadline for their full integration into the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) was set at 9 January 2006. Third, a number 
of commissions called for in the CPA were still not established. Fourth, the 
Joint Integrated Units (JIUs), combined Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and 
SPLA units, were not formed. Fifth, an anti-United Nations campaign in 
Khartoum and other cities, in response to UNMIS’ criticisms on Darfur, grew. 
Sixth, a number of external factors played a negative role in the implementation 
of the peace agreement. The LRA, a Ugandan rebel group remained present in 
southern Sudan, while the relations of Khartoum with Chad and Eritrea 
deteriorated.9 
UNMIS spend a lot of attention to other conflicts in Sudan at the expense of 
the implementation of the CPA. It monitored the talks between the Sudanese 
government and the Eastern Front, which led to the Eastern Peace Agreement 
and strongly improved the Sudanese-Eritrean relations. It was also very vocal 
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on the issue of Darfur, causing deliberate targeting of UNMIS personnel in the 
second half of 2006, and was heavily involved in the mediation of the DPA. 
Nonetheless, at the start of 2007 substantial improvement of the situation in 
southern Sudan and the ‘North-South’ conflict had been made.10 
 
In the autumn of 2007, however, sufficient issues remained open for the SPLM 
to play hard ball and withdraw from the GoNU. As such it started what has 
been called ‘the troubles’. Two important issues were the Abyei boundary issue 
and a reshuffle of the GoNU cabinet, which was required by the SPLM. A third 
important issue, was that on the 9 July deadline, a bit less than 90 percent of 
the SAF had been withdrawn from the South. As SAF forces stayed behind, 
Khartoum was in violation of the agreements. The remainder was said to be 
kept to protect the oil fields until the JIUs were deployed. Although also the 
SPLA stayed in the North, it was only required to withdraw once the JIUs were 
present. Both parties, however, send their weaker troops to form the JIUs, and 
because of this these forces, which were meant to become elite forces, in fact 
needed extra training. Khartoum does not finance the JIUs and does also not 
accept technical assistance. At the same time, the SPLM benefits from the fact 
that the JIUs are not deployed, as it enables it to maintain its forces in the 
North and does not trigger the deadline for its withdrawal. In spite of these 
three issues, it is not unlikely that the ‘troubles’ were more part of a strategy of 
the SPLM to regain attention of the international community away from Darfur 
towards CPA implementation, and to hide SPLM infighting. Many of the 
SPLM leaders have been absorbed into, or at least tight connections with, the 
Khartoum elites. They now receive a share of the oil income and political 
power, what they no longer want to give up. As such the CPA has at least 
become an elite pact. At the same time, the ‘troubles’ and their rhetoric may 
have caught their own dynamics in which separation and the restart of the war 
may become more logical.11 
The factors for success and failure of peacekeeping operations applied 
to the case of UNMIS 
The parties are willing and sincere 
The CPA is a negotiated solution in the conflict between the GoS and the 
SPLM/A. Although these two parties were the largest and main parties in the 
conflict, a number of ‘other armed groups’ were present in southern Sudan. 
Efforts to bring these ‘other armed groups’ into the CPA had initially only 
limited success. The continuous presence of the LRA remains a security threat 
in the region, as long as the Ugandan peace process has not come to a 
conclusion, but is presently in control. A second large ‘other armed group’, the 
South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) has been integrated into the SPLA, 
through the Juba Declaration. Although the SPLM has not been able to unite 
all factions in the South, at least they all respect the peace agreement. In the 
North the National Democratic Alliance, an alliance of 13 political parties of - 
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amongst others - the Democratic Unionist Party and the Umma Party, 
committed itself to the CPA as well and joined the GoNU. Consequently, the 
‘other armed groups’ appear to be no longer an issue. Nonetheless, support for 
the CPA amongst the northern opposition is based on the assumption that it 
will lead to democracy. Thus far, according to them, it only appears to have 
provided legitimacy to the NCP and the SPLM, and therefore this support is 
waning.12 
 
The CPA itself was the result of a negotiation process between Taha and 
Garang. In the course of this process, slowly trust grew in their personal 
relation, which sped-up the negotiations. In addition, both parties were 
convinced that they would be able to solve outstanding or new issues personally 
and consequently did not include a mechanism in the accord in the event that 
the parties were not able to overcome their differences. The general conviction 
is that both parties at the time of the signing of the CPA were sincere and 
willing. Whether they still are is frequently questioned.13 
 
The strength and capacity of the NCP, through the GoS and the GoNU, is 
large compared to that of the governments of countries in which peacekeeping 
operations are usually deployed. As a result, the influence of UNMIS on the 
policies and activities of the NCP is inherently more limited. The operation has 
less leverage and is based upon the consent of Khartoum. Without its 
cooperation UNMIS is unable to implement much. As a result, for example, 
the rule of law unit of UNMIS faces large obstacles in implementing its 
policies, as Khartoum is not interested in cooperation. This makes the 
importance of the willingness and sincerity of the NCP even greater. Within the 
NCP, there are those who view the CPA as the only way to maintain the unity 
of the country and a possibility to integrate the SPLM into the elite. These 
members are often called the reformers. There are also those who view the CPA 
as a trap that may cause the loss of power for the NCP. This group is often 
called the hardliners. Bashir’s role resembles that of the chairman of a seminar, 
searching for consensus between the different factions of his party. He is merely 
a primus inter pares. Already from the start of UNAMIS the NCP was hesitant to 
fully cooperate with the operation and the GoS deliberately tried to slow down 
its deployment. It tried to maintain its sovereignty as much as possible. 
Nonetheless, from the signing of the CPA until the death of Garang, the 
reformist group was strongest. Thereafter the hardliners group gained in power 
and the relationship between the NCP and the SPLM came under pressure. 
Garang was also in the North regarded as a potential leader for a ‘new Sudan’, 
and within the NCP at least seen as someone who could be trusted in his wish 
to maintain the unity of the country. Garang was succeeded by Salva Kiir, who 
is less able to maintain good relations with the NCP. The position of the NCP 
towards UNMIS also became less favourable and cooperative. This hesitant 
position strengthened as the United Nations became more vocal on the issue of 
Darfur, and UN involvement was advocated as a solution for that conflict. At 
the beginning of 2006, the NCP supported protests and campaigns against the 
United Nations. Moreover, the NCP started to frustrate UNMIS’ operations. It 
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opposed UNMIS Radio broadcasting in the North and Darfur. In addition, 
restrictions were placed on the freedom of movement of UN personnel and 
Sudanese UNMIS staff was arrested. Furthermore, it was slow to allow full 
deployment in the mission area and materiel was slow to clear customs. The 
relations between the United Nations and Khartoum became increasingly tense 
and eventually culminated when the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General, Jan Pronk, was declared persona non grata in October 2006. 
Nonetheless, the NCP did make small steps, for example regarding human 
rights. At the same time it appears that international pressure, if not backed by 
force or power, only strengthens the hardliners in their sieged castle mentality.14  
 
Initially the SPLM/A was reluctant towards cooperation with UNMIS. Garang 
did not trust the international community, the United Nations and NGOs as in 
the past they had been perceived to cooperate too much with the government. 
Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) had de facto supported the presence of the 
GoS in southern Sudan, by supporting the garrison towns. For this reason, 
UNAMIS was not allowed access to the areas under control of the SPLA. After 
the death of Garang the position of the SPLM started to shift. Kiir is much 
more in favour of independence for the South. At the same time, he is better 
able to unite the South and integrate the SSDF into the SPLA, a task Garang 
would have been less able to perform. At present, however, the battle within the 
SPLM between the unionists and the separatist is not yet over. Nonetheless, the 
SPLM/A has become more willing to cooperate with UNMIS, amongst other 
reasons because it found it had underestimated its own capacity to govern the 
South. It has started to request a lot of support and became a lot more 
enthusiastic and open to the international involvement. Still the SPLM only 
cooperates to the extent that it expects gains. It does not fully open-up and is 
especially interested in funds. During ‘the troubles’, however, the SPLM called 
for a stronger mandate for UNMIS.15  
 
At present, a number of issues still need resolution and both SPLM/A and NCP 
have proven to be reluctant to take difficult steps. Their cooperation with 
UNMIS is related to this. At a national level the parties continue to contest the 
interpretation of several aspects of the CPA. Nonetheless, this is viewed to be as 
part of a ‘game’, by those who play this ‘game’. This attitude is not surprising as 
both the NCP top as the SPLM/A top have a common interest in peace and 
dividing the spoils of the oil fields. Moreover, the NCP hopes to prevent a war 
on two or even more fronts. The parties may by now have crossed a point of no 
return. On the other hand, both parties play the ‘game’ without pulling their 
punches, which is extremely dangerous as they may loose control over their 
power base or may no longer be able to give in without loosing face. Many at 
the mid-ranks in the SPLM/A have not yet been able to pick the fruits of peace. 
As they do not see what is in it for them, they may run out of control. At the 
same time at state level, both parties appear to work quite well together, while 
on the local level many conflicts between communities are still unresolved.16 
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Providing a sufficient sense of security 
The role of UNMIS in providing security to civilians is limited. At the start of 
the operation, security in southern Sudan and the transitional areas remained 
unsettled. In the areas where UNMIS became active the security situation 
improved in the course of 2006. With regard to the South, however, at the end 
of 2006 tensions increased in areas where ‘other armed groups’ continued to 
operate. In those areas an increased number of violent clashes took place, while 
the LRA equally remained a destabilizing factor. The protection of civilians by 
UNMIS was difficult in this widespread insecurity. Now, the situation has 
improved strongly, although largely due to the SPLA and the Juba Declaration. 
With regard to the transitional areas, Abyei was less secure at the start of the 
operation. Especially when the “final and binding” ruling of the Abyei 
Boundary Commission was refused by the NCP, the situation became tense. 
UNMIS increased presence in this region helped to stabilize the situation.17 
Both parties do not feel UNMIS can provide them security. Speaker of the 
house of the GoSS, James Wani Igga, summarizes the general view on UNMIS 
well, referring to a “leopard without teeth. Once the sheep know this, they will 
play around.”18 Indeed UNMIS is not always taken seriously, because when 
matters turn hot its personnel is said to flee into its barracks. As UNMIS has no 
robust mandate and ways to punish violators, it is not feared and consequently 
less respected. This leads the SPLM/A to the argument that their only sense of 
security “is the SPLA”.19 Nonetheless, at the time of the CPA negotiations, and 
even though some may regret it now, in addition to the NCP the SPLM also 
did not wish to have a robust UNMIS mandate. However, although UNMIS is 
not mandated robustly under chapter VII of the Charter and with only about 
10,000 uniformed personnel, it does contribute to the sense of security of the 
parties. It does so by mediating and resolving clashes between ethnic groups 
and armed forces. Its mere presence increases security, similar to the manner in 
which in marital fights one does not quarrel in front of visitors. The parties do 
not want to be caught violating the agreement in the presence of a witness.20  
Attention for the causes of the conflict 
In theory, the CPA, and UNMIS as part of its implementation, provides a 
solution to a number of Sudan’s causes of conflict. If implemented, the CPA 
starts a process of political transformation and democratisation in both northern 
as southern Sudan, that may lead to further addressing the causes of the many 
conflicts in the country. In addition, it provides in power and wealth sharing 
agreements between the North and the South, which to a large extent may be 
sufficient incentives for the South to choose the road of unity.21 
Also in practise, UNMIS attempts to address a number of causes of conflict. It 
hopes to improve inter-group relations through facilitation, support, and 
encouragement of local reconciliation initiatives. In this regard, the United 
Nations hosted meetings between tribal leaders to talk about the seasonal 
migration of nomads through farming areas. These discussions led to 
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agreements, decreased tensions in Abyei and southern Sudan, and migrations of 
nomads without major incidents. It was, however, the decision of the SPLM/A 
and the government to incorporate and integrate the ‘other armed groups’, that 
mostly improved the inter-group relations. At a national level UNMIS has done 
little to address discrimination of Africans and non-Muslims in the North. The 
majority of the northerners does still not regard southerners as equals, but as 
inferiors.22 
 
With regard to the strength of the state, the establishment of the GoNU, the 
swearing-in of the new Presidency, the inauguration of the two Chambers of 
national legislature and the adoption of the Interim National Constitution were 
important first steps to recreate a common structure for government in Sudan. 
With regard to the South in 2005 the GoSS was established to govern the 
southern states. While the GoSS as a new entity is generally regarded to be 
lacking capacity, the government in the North is often viewed to be strong. The 
latter perception is, however, not entirely correct. One might even argue that 
the government in Khartoum is in fact weak. Nonetheless, society is even 
weaker. It is a myth that Khartoum is in control of all government structures 
throughout the country. Quite often it is not, and parts of the government 
apparatus are either not aware of what other parts are doing, or are even 
thwarting each other. Moreover, only the security apparatus is, to a certain 
extent, strong. Other parts of the government are certainly not. Nonetheless, 
UNMIS directs most of its attention for capacity and institution building to the 
South, amongst other reasons because the North is less open to assistance. The 
GoSS, indeed, lacks capacity and educated personnel to direct and implement 
policies. Consequently, also the process of development is very slow as the 
region is being build-up from scratch. One has to keep in mind, however, that 
in Sudan amongst the population the state is not considered popular, due to its 
violent nature in the past. By cooperating with the state, UNMIS is therefore 
sometimes viewed to be partisan. The traditional tribal structures, including 
tribal courts, are barely supported although these do possess a lot of capacity to 
solve conflicts. One should, however, not idealize the traditional structures, 
such as the courts, because also these have their (human rights) flaws.23 
 
Whereas the North is often said to be capable but unwilling, the South is 
generally viewed to be willing but incapable. This is, however, again a too 
simple picture. Also the GoSS is sometimes not in favour of some, for example 
human rights and democratisation, policies of UNMIS. Moreover, the GoSS 
and the SPLM are often criticized of not being representative of all the ethnic 
groups in southern Sudan, and being predominantly Dinka. Furthermore, it is 
remarkable that although the elections are supposed to be the bedrock of the 
CPA process, an electoral system has not been decided upon. Democratisation 
although agreed upon in the CPA, is not necessarily a finished business. Both 
the NCP and the SPLM loose power if this process proceeds, and therefore 
they may search for loopholes to avoid implementation. Nonetheless, the 
human rights and democracy situation has improved. Both parties released their 
political detainees. UNMIS’ role in this is, however, limited. Although the 
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UNMIS Rule of Law Division in southern Sudan has been quit effective, as it 
has been co-located in the GoSS ministries, its Human Rights Division has 
been much more directed at Darfur and not so much at the rest of the country. 
Furthermore, at the end of 2007, UNMIS still had to build its capacity to 
provide assistance for the 2008/2009 elections.24 
 
Demographic pressure resulting from landmines and IDPs are addressed by 
UNMIS. Vast areas of southern Sudan were severely polluted by mines and 
unexploded ordnances. While Khartoum did have the capacity and expertise to 
deal with this issue, the SPLM/A did not have the right personnel and materiel. 
For this reason, UNMIS has supported a coordinated national strategy on mine 
action. Many IDPs are presently better-off in the places where they live than in 
their places of origin. In absence of social and physical infrastructure and 
services they are not likely to return. Many also wait and see how the security 
situation develops. In addition, some do not feel welcome in the South, as they 
are treated by the SPLM/A as traitors of the North. In practice, many IDPs stay 
in the cities and become part of an urbanization process. Although many 
refugees in the region have been repatriated by UNHCR and UNMIS, those 
who live in the West are more reluctant to return as they are used to higher 
living standards.25 
 
To address the economic causes of the conflict and to ensure economic 
recovery, a Multi-Donor Trust Fund was established in 2005. Grant 
agreements between the GoSS and the GoNU and the World Bank were signed 
in 2006. Disbursements of donor funds through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, 
however, stayed behind expectations. The regulations of the World Bank were 
too time-consuming and the GoSS lacked capacity to fulfil the whole process. 
Especially the three transitional areas, Abyei, Blue Nile and Southern 
Kordofan, which needed recovery most, saw relatively little economic 
improvement. The Multi-Donor Trust Fund has been directed too much at 
long-term development, while the situation in southern Sudan still requires 
emergence assistance. At the same time emergency funds have ended and 
NGOs have started to withdraw their activities because the situation is no 
longer considered a humanitarian emergency and Darfur is regarded more 
important.26 
 
The slow progress with regard to the DDR process in the South is not due to a 
lack of a sense of security of the SPLM. It is rather the opposite. The SPLM is 
interested in downsizing its present tribal army into a modern professional 
conventional one, as it knows that to win a potential next (border)war, it does 
not need a large guerrilla army. Moreover, it cannot afford its large army 
anymore, and lack of payments has already caused mutinies and revolts. 
Nonetheless, the SPLM/A also needs to integrate the ‘other armed groups’, 
needs to have alternative jobs for demobilized personnel and needs to satisfy all 
the tribes. If this is not done, demobilization becomes dangerous, as the forces – 
SPLA or the ‘other armed groups’ integrated into it – may revolt. The slow 
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DDR process in Sudan is as such not so much a security issue, but a 
developmental problem.27  
Cooperation from important outside actors and parties 
Troop contributing countries were not very forthcoming in their pledges and 
those who did were not able to meet the deployment plans, which slowed down 
the deployment. At the Oslo international donors conference for the 
reconstruction and economic development of Sudan 4.5 billion US$ was 
pledged for the first three years following the signing of the CPA. 
Disbursements were, however, very slow. In all sectors, humanitarian, recovery 
and development, needs remained high and urgent, while funds were not 
sufficient. Worse, since southern Sudan was no longer regarded a humanitarian 
disaster situation, funds available for the region actually decreased. OCHA for 
example withdrew from the South.28 
 
International attention for implementation of the CPA and for UNMIS waned, 
amongst other reasons because it was overshadowed by the crisis in the Darfur. 
It was no longer a priority. In addition to the fact that Darfur was more ‘sexy’ 
and drew attention away, it also meant that in order to get things done in 
Darfur trade-offs had to be made with regard to the CPA and UNMIS. 
Moreover, pressuring Khartoum via UNMIS did not coincide very well with its 
role as an honest broker. In effect, the guarantors of the CPA to a large extent 
lost interest. The IGAD as mediator in the peace process would have been the 
organization to support its implementation. Nonetheless, Kenya, the chair at 
the time of the negotiations, became inward looking, because it had to deal with 
its own internal political problems. The chairs of IGAD after Kenya were less 
interested in Sudan. Moreover, as the sub-commission on Sudan had been 
dissolved, there was no follow-up mechanism left. The permanent members of 
the Security Council did not speak with one voice. China in defence of its oil 
interest, needs to stay friends with both parties and can therefore not offend 
either of them. Moreover, Beijing, alike Moscow, wants to maintain the 
sovereignty of Khartoum, because of its own internal conflicts and policies. 
Both China and Russia have obstructed UNMIS a number of times. China, for 
example, opposed the UNMIS human rights budget and Russia send the radio 
broadcasting equipment it promised late. The attention of France was much 
more directed at the spill-over effects on Chad and the CAR of the conflict in 
Darfur. The UK and the US became much more interested in Darfur itself. 
Besides, the vocal statements of the US on Darfur were no more than hot air, 
because Washington placed its bets on the NCP in the war on terror. 
Consequently, the only international organ able to strengthen the mandate and 
capacity of UNMIS, did not do so. In addition, the only institution through 
which the international community could influence the process, the Assessment 
and Evaluation Commission (AEC), became sidelined not only due to 
disinterest of its members, but also because the SPLM does not want to use the 
AEC as this organ reports to the president. Although the AEC was foreseen 
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during the CPA negotiations as the body that during the implementation could 
mediate upcoming issues, and it could have functioned as a way for UNMIS to 
expand and strengthen its mandate, it did not.29 
Operation is timely deployed and at the right time 
The establishment of UNMIS was at a ripe moment for resolution of the 
‘North-South’ conflict. The GoS and the SPLM had reached a ‘mutually 
hurting stalemate’ in which both parties saw no opportunities for a military 
victory anymore. It appeared, at the time of the CPA, that with the 
continuation of a peace process more could be won. The SPLM finally received 
a stake in government, while the NCP in a potential future process of 
democratisation would need support of the SPLM if it wished to maintain 
control over its northern ‘heartland’.30 
 
Already at an early stage, with the Naivasha Agreement in 2003, the United 
Nations declared to be willing to monitor the implementation of the peace 
agreement. An Interdepartmental Task Force was established to follow the 
peace process closely and serve as a forum for the development of a common 
strategy for the implementation of the final agreement. In 2004, the Security 
Council declared its readiness to consider the establishment of a peace support 
operation and asked the Secretary-General to make the necessary preparations. 
Shortly after, the Secretary-General appointed Jan Pronk as his Special 
Representative for the Sudan, followed by the establishment of the special 
political mission UNAMIS. At the end of 2004, a liaison office was established 
in Nairobi to ensure continuous United Nations presence at the peace talks, to 
provide advice and expertise on matters related to its future role in the 
implementation of an agreement. Everything seemed to be on track for a timely 
deployment.31 
 
In spite of these preparations deployment was delayed, initially because of the 
absence of a status-of-force agreement and other constraints imposed by both 
the GoS and the SPLM/A, as well as because the rainy season was an obstacle 
for transportation, logistical and preparatory activities. As a result, whilst 
UNAMIS was deployed as an advance mission to prepare for UNMIS, the 
preparations were in fact rather limited. Half a year into the UNMIS mission 
only 821 of the 10,000 authorized uniformed personnel was deployed. One year 
after the start, as a result of delays in the force-generation process, this number 
had only grown to 4,291. In addition, the deployment was delayed due to the 
heightened security status south of Juba which blocked transport, and local 
contractors could not provide sufficient vehicles and barges. It was well into 
2007 before UNMIS approached its mandated military strength. By that time 
the operation continued to struggle to recruit and retain well-qualified 
international and national civilian personnel, as still more than 1000 of the 
4712 posts remained vacant.32 Nonetheless, the operation had finally crossed 
the critical boundary of a less than 20 percent vacancy rate required to operate 
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effectively. Now, however, the operation has to fight off its weak and unable 
image that has been build up during the initial years.33 
 
Competent leadership and personnel, and clear command structures 
As an integrated multidimensional peace support operation UNMIS consists of 
a wide range of components. The Special Representative takes care of the 
reinforcement and complementation of the different elements of the United 
Nations system. The mission area includes six distinct sectors. Each sector is 
headed by a civilian sector director, supported by a sector commander in charge 
of all military personnel. There is one headquarter in Khartoum and one special 
office in Juba. On the military side, command structures within UNMIS are 
clear. On the civilian side, less clarity exists. Command structures within units 
and organizations are clear, but especially during the period when UNMIS 
lacked leadership, its operations lacked coordination and were dependent on 
cooperation by heads of units at lower levels. This often depended on personal 
preferences and chemistry. Consequently, where areas of attention of units and 
organizations overlapped, this frequently resulted in organizational infighting.34 
 
At the start, under Pronk, clear leadership existed and, where required, he used 
the constructive ambiguity of the UNMIS mandate to stretch it. On the other 
hand, he did walk the moral ground and, although he may have been right to 
criticize Khartoum on its non-implementation and especially on Darfur, his 
approach was less effective in the end due to four factors. 
 
First, he was too direct. He criticized people directly, in strong wordings and in 
the presence of others. According to Sudanese costumes this is not done. This 
lack of cultural awareness affected the good will UNMIS initially had acquired 
in the North. Secondly, he was unable to walk the tightrope of being an honest 
neutral broker and at the same time criticizing parties. Consequently, he came 
to be viewed as partisan. Thirdly, as he was occupied with Darfur, he lost 
support in the South, as the SPLM felt abandoned. Fourth, his strong wordings 
were not substantiated by strong deeds. In the end, Pronk’s outcry did not lead 
to tougher actions by the United Nations. Worse, the fact that he was declared 
persona non grata in October 2006 was accepted by the Secretary-General, while 
instead the United Nations should have backed up its local leadership. 
Subsequently, UNMIS faced a leadership crisis. Few were eager to step in the 
position Pronk lost, and those who were willing and qualified were rejected by 
Khartoum. This gap was only filled with the appointment of Ashraf Jehangir 
Qazi in September 2007, who only became actively involved in Sudan in 
October-November. For about one year, the Acting Special Representative was 
only able to manage the operation. Since he was only ‘acting’ he did not have a 
lot of political weight, what prevented him from exerting political pressure and 
stretching the mandate for UNMIS to include mediation between the parties. 
As a result UNMIS was not able to take up this role during the ‘troubles’. The 
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operation as a whole was forced to lick its wounds, fell back to the letter of its 
mandate and only few dared to stand up against the NCP out of fear to be 
expelled. The Acting Special Representative was, however, able to repair part of 
the relation with Khartoum and reorganized the mission. Nonetheless, Qazi is 
likely to have a difficult job as an honest broker. The operation is still perceived 
partisan in the North, while in the South the fact that he is Muslim does not 
support him. The first signs are, though, that he might be on the right track.35 
 
The quality of the military component differs per contingent. Nonetheless, quit 
often the contingents are not open in their operations, as they do not 
sufficiently patrol, and make contact with NGOs and the population. As a 
result, they often lack the necessary information and are less able to prevent 
crises. UNMOs, due to their short period of stay, often do not get enough 
feeling for the situation. Once they start to understand it, they are already on 
leave or ending their tour. Due to this high turnover and the rotation system, 
UNMOs are less able to establish contacts and see the deeper trends. In stead, 
they report strings of incidents. UNMIS has a lot of quality civilian personnel at 
its disposal and was especially at its start able to employ many of the more 
experienced international personnel who had already been working in Sudan in 
OLS and for NGOs. Nonetheless, it faces the problem that international 
personnel is hesitant to serve in UNMIS, as it is not viewed as a real CV 
builder. In addition, living conditions, especially in parts of the South do not 
attract international personnel. Furthermore, as a result of personal 
appointments the best personnel was not always appointed on the positions 
where they were needed. Moreover, a number of the experience staff left the 
organization again, because they became frustrated with it. Part of these 
frustrations originate from procurement, which is understaffed, less effective 
and forced to over-regulate by New York. Although these regulations were 
meant to address corruption, presently they create inertia. With regard to 
national civilian personnel, the operation faces recruitment problems, as it 
recruits from the elites, which is often alienated from the rest of the population. 
Moreover, in the North some of it staff have also been recruited by the national 
security agencies. In the South especially lack of qualified personnel, education 
wise, is problematic. Due to its cumbersome recruitment procedures and the 
focus on qualifications instead of experience, UNMIS is less able to address 
these problems. Finally, UNMIS is not always sensitive about who and what - 
be it an UNMO, a civilian police monitor, a civilian staff member or a 
contingent - it sends where to. Gender, ethnicity, and religion are relevant in 
this context. For example, the deployment of Egyptian military in South 
Kordofan is not ideal, as they are viewed by the SPLM and the local population 
as partisan.36 
Operation is part of a long term approach 
The overall impact of UNMIS as part of a long term approach will probably be 
less than what was initially hoped for. It mainly has a monitoring mandate, 
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which ends with its departure, so that it does not leave behind many sustainable 
structures. Furthermore, it often does not build on the already existing policies 
of the UN country team and the multi-donor approach. In the North, this is 
largely a result from the fact that the NCP is less open to UNMIS, especially 
under Pronk, while Khartoum has a longstanding working relation with UNDP. 
In the South, the attitude within UNMIS is sometimes as if Sudan has only 
recently been discovered, while the country team, OLS and NGOs have already 
learned many lessons and have many initiatives to build on. Moreover, whereas 
the country team is active at the state level, UNMIS operates in sectors that are 
larger than these states, causing it to be less grounded into the lower levels of 
the country and therefore it often has less knowledge of the local situation. 
Consequently, UNMIS has often set up new policies from scratch. For 
example, in the case of disarmament, UNDP had already developed a plan 
together with the local partners. Nonetheless, when UNMIS was deployed, it 
came with its own standard blue print, sidetracked the UNDP program and 
implemented its own strategy. In the end, however, the extent to which 
UNMIS is part of a long term approach differs per policy instrument. With 
regard to police training, for example, because of the cooperation between 
UNMIS, UNDP and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, there is a potential for 
sustainability. Also with regard to human rights and humanitarian assistance, 
UNMIS is more part of a long term approach. The OHCHR and OCHA 
cooperate relatively well with the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO), as they are all part of the United Nations secretariat. 
However, with regard to human rights, UNMIS does not involve a lot of civil 
society, does not stimulate a culture of human rights and does not or is unable 
to build institutions, which is likely to affect its results in the long term.37  
Within the operation and externally the different policy instruments are 
coordinated 
As an integrated mission, UNMIS attempts to coordinate all the efforts of the 
United Nations system via the operation. From their appointment onward, the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and his two deputies worked to 
ensure that the structure of UNMIS became unified and that the special 
political mission and the country team were integrated. It was intended that the 
roles and functions of both structures would complement and not duplicate 
each other. Even before the start of the operation a number of mechanisms 
were set up to channel all the efforts. An Interdepartmental Task Force was 
established to serve as a forum for the development of a common strategy for 
the implementation of the CPA. Furthermore, the Secretary-General appointed 
several coordinators, to ensure a joint unified strategy among the United 
Nations components, agencies and programs. Arrangements were made 
between the World Bank and the United Nations to hold a Joint Assessment 
Mission after the signing of the peace agreement. Also, the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General worked with the United Nations 
country team to develop a unified structure. Half a year after the start of 
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UNMIS close cooperation between the mission and UNDP had also been 
established on a number of subjects.38 
 
In practice, however, the coordination appears to be far from ideal. 
Complementing processes do not always connect fluently. In DDRR, the DDR 
is provided by UNMIS, while the reintegration is implemented and paid for by 
UNDP. As UNMIS is pushed by the Security Council to start the DDR 
process as soon as possible, coordination with UNDP suffers. Consequently, it 
becomes questionable whether UNDP is able to reintegrate all the disarmed, 
demobilized and reinserted ex-combatants. Overlap and duplication are also 
frequent and different parts of the United Nations system often hamper each 
other. There is still a lot of competition between organizations with overlapping 
mandates. To use the example of rule of law, UNDP is supposed to coordinate 
this field. Its clearing house role is, however, under-performing, at meetings the 
local government is often absent, while UNDP hopes to become more directive 
in the content of policies. At the same time the Police Division cooperates well 
with UNDP, but typically has a more difficult relationship with the Human 
Rights Section. Another problem is that UNMIS generally lacks funds for 
programs. As a result, it can provide training for capacity building, but does not 
have the funds for hotels and meals for participants. This in turn creates 
credibility problems for the operation, not only amongst the participants of such 
trainings, but also amongst the country team which gets the impression it is 
only perceived as a pot of gold. The underlying issue remains the problem of 
the different funding under the assessed and the voluntary contributions. 
Furthermore, as personnel from the country team is only integrated on paper 
and is not formally part of the operation, it has not the same rights and cannot 
use the same UNMIS services, facilities and security plans. For example, the 
country team widely complaints that UNMIS does not share its logistical and 
air assets enough, while UNMIS argues it does not have enough capacity. An 
additional problem is the different perceptions on priorities in Juba and 
Khartoum. This friction exists throughout the UN system, both in UNMIS and 
in UNDP. Moreover, in the field stove piping is a problem, as information is 
send to Khartoum and local coordination and information sharing is less 
frequent. Cooperation and coordination between the civilian components and 
the military component is also not optimal. In the end, integration depends to a 
large extent on personalities.39 
Operation provides ‘ownership’ 
Although the parties were pressured to conclude the CPA and it was a lot more 
legalistic in its approach than one would expect as a result of Arab or African 
negotiations, it was their own agreement. They own it and in fact the 
international community is in search of the role it should play. The United 
States did pressure the parties into signing, but left the role of the United 
Nations to the parties. During the negotiations at many points Garang and 
Taha wanted to prevent too large an influence of the international community. 
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The NCP wished to maintain sovereignty, and the SPLM felt it should be able 
to manage the process itself. However, with the death of Garang and the 
diminished importance of Taha, the parties were no longer as interested in the 
implementation of the whole agreement. Both parties still own and value the 
repatriation process. To the SPLM, especially capacity and institution building, 
the referendum and the possible vote for independence are still very important. 
To the NCP, peace as such remains useful, as it allows more space to 
manoeuvre in the Darfur conflict. Nonetheless, for example, the agenda for 
political transition has lost importance to both parties and is therefore no longer 
owned by them. Together with parts of the CPA, the ‘ownership’ of a number 
of ‘policy tools’ implemented by UNMIS also waned. Nonetheless, where the 
SPLM was initially also reluctant to allow a large international role in capacity 
building, they presently request assistance in many areas. Khartoum, on the 
other hand, remains far from interested in UNMIS assistance for and presence 
in its administration.40 
 
At the same time, the population has little knowledge of the contents of the 
CPA and the mandate of UNMIS. The situation has only slightly started to 
improve since UNMIS Radio Miraya started to broadcast from Juba half 2006. 
The Khartoum government has, however, still not given a nation-wide 
authorization to broadcast, while it has held-up broadcasting equipment 
destined to the South. Moreover, Radio Miraya does not reach all layers of the 
population, as it only broadcasts in Arabic and English. The northern 
opposition is disappointed in the implementation of the CPA, because it did 
not lead to political transformation thus far. Moreover, NCP propaganda has 
influenced the perception of the Arab population to the extent that UNMIS is 
for a large part viewed as a western instrument. The southern population 
initially largely welcomed UNMIS, partly because they misunderstood its 
mandate. They perceived UNMIS as ‘saviour’ of the southern population from 
its Arab ‘oppressors’. This perception started to change firstly following the 
accusations of sexual abuse and secondly after the 9 July deadline, when it 
appeared that UNMIS would not repel the SAF from southern territory. In 
absence of large scale development, with too few Quick Impact Projects, and 
with too little dissemination of information on the role of UNMIS, the 
operation is increasingly viewed as useless, because its personnel is perceived to 
do little more than sit in its offices or barracks and drive around in white cars.41 
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Case specific factors for success and failure 
From the case of UNMIS in the ‘North-South’ conflict, one case specific factor 
for success and failure appears that requires extra attention. 
 
Operation is able to provide in an arms control regime 
In Sudan, like in Ethiopia, Uganda and Chad, weapons are part of life. 
Throughout history cattle owners needed to protect their properties, especially 
in times of scarcity. In an area where cattle raids are common, those whose 
means of living is cattle cannot live without arms. If one group would disarm, 
other groups, remnants of militia, or ‘other armed groups’ may take advantage. 
This situation can only change if the circumstances improve, if the government 
is able to provide security, justice, and law and order. At present these 
circumstances are largely absent. Moreover, as arms can flow freely across 
borders, it is a regional problem. Civilian disarmament therefore appears to be 
an illusion in the short term. The two disarmament projects implemented by 
UNDP to prevent forced disarmament by the SPLA show the potential 
implications. Although the projects in themselves were successful, the SPLA 
did not live up to its security guarantees and consequently neighbouring tribes 
were able to take advantage as the disarmed tribes were left unprotected. It is 
impossible to disarm every group simultaneously, without creating the broader 
conditions. Therefore, in small steps the conditions need to be addressed first 
and only vulnerable groups need to be disarmed simultaneously. Basically this 
implies that in order to deal with the problem, development is needed and the 
traditional way of living of the population has to be adapted.42  
Concluding remarks 
At present a look at the factors for success and failure presents a mixed picture 
of UNMIS. Since the death of Garang the parties are only willing and sincere to 
cooperate with UNMIS to the extent that they view its implementation of the 
CPA in their own advantage. It is too weak to provide the parties a real sense of 
security, but its presence is very relevant as a guarantee that the parties will not 
blatantly violate the agreement. Some of the causes of the conflict are partly 
addressed by UNMIS, but the extent to which democratisation will take place 
and the power and wealth sharing will become nationwide, depends on the 
parties themselves. The international community in the meantime has largely 
lost interest in CPA implementation and turned to Darfur. It even used 
UNMIS and CPA implementation as a trade-off for the involvement and 
deployment of the United Nations in Darfur. Moreover, none of the permanent 
members of the Security Council is sincerely interested and willing to offend 
the NCP. Although the United Nations was involved at an early stage in the 
peace process and was even able to deploy the advance mission UNAMIS, both 
parties were not willing to fully cooperate. Due to successful dragging by 
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Khartoum, it took until well into 2007, two years after the signing of the CPA, 
before UNMIS was finally fully deployed. The operation suffered further as a 
result of the fact that its leadership, Pronk, was declared persona non grata and 
was forced to leave. Consequently, the mission was left headless for one year, 
what in turn influenced its coordination. The quality of its personnel is mixed. 
The extent to which the UNMIS is part of a long term approach differs per 
‘policy instrument’. On some issues the ‘policy instruments’ are part of a 
broader approach, while one may question the sustainability of others. 
Although within the context of the concept of the integrated operation, a lot 
attention has been given to coordination, in practise duplication, overlap, 
stovepiping and organisational infighting have been frequent. Nonetheless, the 
parties fully own CPA implementation and as such UNMIS. The population is, 
however, much less aware of what they may and may not expect from UNMIS 
and the CPA. Civilian disarmament, which is not part of UNMIS’ mandate, 
will most likely be an enormous challenge especially because the conditions for 
arms control are not yet present.  
 
The probability that a peacekeeping operation contributes to durable peace 
increases if the extent to which it fulfils the factors for success and failure 
increases. In its performance UNMIS is not very different from an average 
relatively successful peacekeeping operation. Often operations face tough issues, 
such as the ‘troubles’ in Sudan. Even operations which in the end contribute 
successfully to durable peace often face and overcome similar problems. The 
extent to which the most successful operations thus far fulfilled the factors for 
success and failure was often not much different. Many unsuccessful operations 
have performed much worse. As such, however, like any relatively successful 
operation UNMIS’ quest stands upon the edge of a knife. Stray but a little and 
it will fail. Hope remains, however, as also a relative successful operation is a 
walk over the tightrope. 
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The lessons from the peace process and the 
peacekeeping operation in the ‘North-South’ 
conflict applied to the conflict in Darfur 
The most important developments in the peace process in the Darfur 
conflict up to this moment 
The conflict in Darfur is possibly even more complex than the ‘North-South’ 
conflict, but also strongly interlinked with it. The largest party is the GoS. The 
SAF are backed by the Popular Defence Forces (PDF), a paramilitary force 
which is intended to support the SAF, or other security organs, when these are 
unable to perform. The Janjaweed, in turn, originate from the PDF and consists 
of tribal militias that are largely recruited from Baggara nomadic groups. They 
fight an ever more splintering number of rebel groups. The Sudan Liberation 
Movement (SLM) originates from 2003 and is supported by its military wing 
the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA). Aim of the SLM was originally a united and 
democratic Sudan with a separation between religion and the state. The Justice 
and Equality Movement (JEM) also aims for a democratic united Sudan, has 
no clear position on the separation between religion and state, has a clear 
political program for a federal Sudan, and has ties with the political islamist 
Hassan al-Turabi. Since the end of 2004, new organizations have emerged and 
since the signing of the DPA especially the SLM has splintered into numbers of 
factions.43 
 
The outbreak of the conflict coincided with the breakthrough in the ‘North-
South’ dialogue following the signing of the Machakos Protocol, when the SLA 
attacked government targets. The government overreacted harshly, as 
throughout the summer and fall of 2003 attacks by Janjaweed and government 
forces caused death and displacement amongst the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa 
tribes. It was argued that the government strategy was to ‘drain the swamp’ by 
driving civilians from their villages, thereby denying the rebels sanctuary in 
much of Darfur. A first humanitarian cease-fire agreement was signed in 
N’Djamena in September 2003. As the agreement did not hold, the 
humanitarian crisis worsened. Negotiations restarted in March 2004 in Chad 
and later in Abuja. Nonetheless, the security situation deteriorated only further. 
One of the problems at the negotiations table was the fact that the Darfurian 
rebels were too divided on their positions, and the United Nations was unable 
to aid them in uniting them. At the same time international NGOs started the 
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‘Safe Darfur’ advocacy and accused the GoS of crimes against humanity and 
even genocide. In April 2004, the African Union decided to establish the 
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). This operation was, however, 
plagued from the start. Its mandate limited it to observation only, without 
proactive protection of civilians. Moreover, it became known for the fact that it 
was under-everything: under-funded, under-equipped, under-staffed, etcetera.44  
 
From October 2004 onwards, the parties negotiated off and on in Abuja. The 
African Union led these talks, but also the Special Representative of Secretary-
General Pronk was engaged in mediation. In the meantime, the government 
engaged in its own process of tribal reconciliation. The Abuja talks were 
undermined and disrupted by the lack of commitment of SLM/A and by the 
continued operations of the GoS. Moreover, the head of the negotiating team of 
the government, Mahzhub al-Khalifa, was a well-known member of the hard-
line group. By April 2005, both JEM and SLM demonstrated signs of deeper 
internal divisions, what further undermined their ability to contribute to the 
political process in a coherent and reliable manner. Eventually the SLM/A split 
into two factions, one of Abdul Wahid and one of Minni Minawi. In spite of all 
these problems the AU mediation team managed to present a comprehensive 
draft agreement at the start of 2006 and pressured the parties to sign before a 
deadline. On 5 May 2006, the GoS and the SLM/A Minawi signed this Darfur 
Peace Agreement, but the SLM/A Wahid, JEM, G19, NMRD and the National 
Redemption Front refused to do so. Since the DPA did have a large number of 
good components for each rebel group, in each group some members were 
willing to support it. As a result, the DPA splintered all rebel organization 
further into signatory factions and non-signatory factions. Those factions that 
did not sign, were subsequently further divided by the government politics of 
divide and rule. Consequently, at the end of 2007 more than 25 rebel 
movements were active in Darfur. Although the NCP tried to reintegrate parts 
of the Darfurian rebel leadership into the Khartoum elite, along the lines it did 
with the SPLM, it was less successful. Minawi’s return to Khartoum was its 
main achievement. At the same time Wahid became enormously popular 
amongst the IDPs, exactly because he refused to talk to Khartoum, and 
demanded individual compensation for the IDPs.45 
 
While the ceasefire between the signatories of the DPA was generally 
maintained, clashes between the SAF, sometimes assisted by Janjaweed militia, 
and non-signatory forces, as well as between signatory rebels, sometimes 
supported by the SAF, and non-signatory rebels, occurred. In its attacks the 
SAF continued to use aerial bombardments, also on civilian targets, in support 
of its ground battles. Inside the camps, the communities of IDPs splintered 
along the same lines as the rebel groups in pro- and anti-DPA. The presence of 
armed groups within the IDP camps made some of these increasingly 
militarised and insecure. At the end of 2007, the situation had, however, 
drastically changed from the war before the DPA. From 2003 to 2005 Darfuri 
villages were burned by the Janjaweed backed by the SAF in the same way the 
war in the South was fought-out in the past. Although fights between the 
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government and rebels do still occur, they are of a different kind and of a 
different intensity. Presently still a number of villages are under threat, but 
many villages have already been destroyed. In fact the security situation on the 
ground was recently described as “relatively calm”.46 Anarchy is a better 
description for the situation. The situation depends, however, from region to 
region. The main issue in the South is the situation in the camps. In a number 
of cases, as a result of fighting between rebel groups, some have been turned 
into virtual war zones. The southern region is also stricken by carjacking and 
criminality, what in turn endangers humanitarian assistance. Whether or not 
these activities are banditry and criminality or are conflict related, is not very 
relevant. Quite often also banditry and criminality is conflict related, because 
the spoils are sold to rebels, or are used to become a ‘rebel’. In the same way, 
the attack on the AMIS camp in Haskanita was meant to provide the necessary 
weapons and cars to equip a new splinter group. Moreover, the so-called 
criminal violence has the same impact on humanitarian assistance. In addition, 
southern Darfur is faced with Arab-Arab clashes. Many Arab tribes in Darfur 
shifted from a position of neutrality in the conflict to an alliance with the rebels 
and the government has started to loose control over the Janjaweed militia. In 
western Darfur, the tensions on the border with Chad remain very high. 
Chadian armed opposition groups have crossed the border into Sudan and 
further destabilize the region. Throughout Darfur, the population and IDPs are 
still living in a continuous feeling of insecurity. Tribal structures have largely 
collapsed and leadership is absent. The Darfurians have little in common left to 
rebuild their region. The running joke in Sudan is presently, that if you have an 
AK-45, a land rover and a Thuraya, you can call yourself a rebel organization 
and claim your place at the negotiations table.47 
 
In the meantime, in absence of a viable political mediation process the 
international community turned its attention to improving the peacekeeping 
operation in the field. Although the AU-secretariat initially opposed the 
transition of AMIS into a United Nations operation, because it viewed such a 
transition as loss of face, with the increasing problematic situation for AMIS, it 
came to see the United Nations as a way out. Already on 12 January 2006, the 
African Union Peace and Security Council expressed its support for the 
transition of AMIS into a UN operation. On 3 February such a transition was 
endorsed by the Security Council for the first time. On 31 August 2006, in its 
resolution 1706, the Security Council decided to expand the mandate of 
UNMIS to support implementation of the DPA and the N’djamena Agreement 
on Humanitarian Cease-fire on the Conflict in Darfur. Nonetheless, the 
consent of the GoS for the deployment of the operation was invited. Khartoum, 
however, never gave its consent. It even made crystal clear that it opposed a 
transition of the Darfur mission from the African Union to the United Nations. 
It viewed the move as an encroachment on its sovereignty, an attempt at 
decolonisation and the climax of efforts to undermine the CPA. With resolution 
1706, the Security Council had overstepped its sphere of influence and lost 
face.48 
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Nonetheless, Khartoum did participate in a high-level consultation in Addis 
Ababa on 16 November 2006, which outlined a three-phased approach for 
United Nations support to AMIS. First a light support package was to be 
provided, followed by a heavy support package, after which finally the operation 
would be turned into an African Union-United Nations hybrid operation. 
Amongst other reasons, because of Chinese pressure, which partly resulted 
from the ‘genocide Olympics’ campaign, on 23 December Bashir reaffirmed his 
government’s readiness to implement these Addis Ababa conclusions. The 
implementation, however, has been painfully slow. Only in April 2007 did the 
then Sudanese Foreign minister Lam Akol announce that Khartoum would give 
permission for the deployment of the heavy support package. It did, however, 
persist in its call that African troops should still dominate any peacekeeping 
mission in Darfur. On 5 June 2007, the Secretary-General produced a report 
which contained the proposal for the deployment of the hybrid operation and 
on 31 July the Security Council approved the deployment of UNAMID.49 
 
Two months later the Security Council decided to deploy the multi-
dimensional United Nations presence, in the border regions in Chad and the 
Central African Republic MINURCAT, which initially is to be supported by 
EUFOR Chad/CAR. Aim of both operations is to protect the citizens of Chad 
and the CAR and to ensure that the war does not spill-over. AMIS at the same 
time was pushed further into a downward spiral. Although initially at the start 
of its deployment, it had been relatively successful whenever it was active in 
forward patrolling, as it proofed not as effective as hoped for, it lost support of 
the population and the rebel groups, and came more and more under fire. As a 
result, it decreased its number of patrols, because these became too dangerous, 
making it even less effective and therefore even less popular. As the 
international response had been to call AMIS ineffective and useless, donors 
withdrew support and started to search for alternatives. AMIS in turn 
demoralized further, making it even less effective. Moreover, the advocacy for 
UNAMID and the fact that it was brought as a way out to improve the situation 
has created high expectations amongst the population, which will be hard to live 
up to.50 
The factors for success and failure and the chances for success for the 
case of UNAMID in Darfur 
The parties are willing and sincere 
At present the parties are not likely and able to seriously work towards peace 
and cooperation with UNAMID. The main problem is that because of the 
splintered rebel factions, no effective political process can be set into motion. 
Without such an inclusive political process the needed sufficient cooperation of 
the parties is not likely to be obtained. The inclusiveness of such a process does, 
however, not necessarily mean all-inclusive. The most important parties need to 
be included. The SPLM initiative to unite the Darfuri rebels showed that there 
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is some willingness and sincerity amongst the rebel organizations. It, however, 
also made clear that the rebel groups are inexperienced. They lack 
understanding of politics and negotiations and need to establish and agree upon 
political goals. Those factions that went to Sirte have a stake in long 
negotiations, because during this period they are paid for their presence. The 
extent to which Khartoum is really in control of the situation in Darfur is 
questionable. Its role, ability and capacity in Darfur is generally overestimated. 
Certain security organizations have their own agenda’s and others work 
together with rebel organizations to establish new power bases. The Janjaweed 
also have their own interests and stake in the conflict. They, but also the larger 
Arab tribes are not part of the negotiations process, although they are part of 
the conflict. In any way, Khartoum is likely to cooperate with UNAMID only 
to the extent necessary to prevent further sanctions. Some in the NCP are even 
inclined to solve the question of Darfur, because they hope to get rid of the 
sanctions. Others fear the deployment of UNAMID, and especially a strong 
UNAMID, as they fear a repetition of SFOR and KFOR in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo. In those two cases, in their perception, in the end the 
Serbian leadership found it had agreed to allow the deployment of a Trojan 
horse. An effective UNAMID might, according to them, result in arrests of 
members of the regime, who may have to face the International Criminal Court 
in The Hague.51 
 
On the ground AMIS lost faith of the parties and the population, because it was 
not able to protect the population and was viewed to be partisan. As everything 
it did had to be coordinated with the government, the population and the rebel 
parties no longer viewed it as an honest broker. At present, expectations are 
high that UNAMID will be able to perform. If it manages to maintain an 
impartial perception and is able to protect the population, it may receive the 
cooperation of the parties and the support of the population. To meet these 
high expectations is very difficult, however, as the majority of the forces are the 
same African forces that AMIS consisted of. Moreover, UNAMID needs the 
support of the rebels and the government to be able to fulfil its tasks. As such, 
the operation will have to cooperate with Khartoum and its local security 
organisations, and in absence of any leverage, it will probably have to negotiate 
most of its actions. It is consequently likely to be viewed as partisan. The first 
signs are dim, as IDPs in the camps have already started to protest against the 
United Nations.52 
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The operation is able to provide a sufficient sense of security to the 
parties 
UNAMID has the mandate under chapter VII to: 
 
“support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace 
Agreement, prevent the disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, 
and protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the 
Government of Sudan.”53  
 
This means that the GoS is the first responsible party for the protection of 
civilians. If the GoS does not fulfil its duties, UNAMID may use force both in 
case the GoS is not present, or when this is opposed to the wishes of the GoS. 
UNAMID is, however, neither capable nor mandated to confront the 
government. As a result UNAMID is not likely to provide the rebels and 
Khartoum related militia in a sense of security. The Khartoum government 
does not feel physically threatened by the rebels in the first place, and therefore 
does not need more security.54 
 
Even if the rebel parties and Khartoum related militia do not feel secure and 
UNAMID does implement the DPA, they may still be willing to cooperate for 
the time being if the operation has the necessary carrots-and-sticks. For this 
reason, the rebel parties and the militia are likely to test UNAMID from the 
start. If it responds weakly they are likely to view it as lacking sticks and 
therefore as a force not to be reckoned with. If the operation shows teeth, it 
may be able to at least temporarily partly control the rebel parties and the 
militia. One can consequently initially expect minor attacks on the operation by 
rebels and Khartoum related militia. The GoNU itself is, however, more likely 
to test its boundaries by further foot dragging with visa regulations, et cetera.55 
The operation has sufficient attention for the causes of the conflict both 
in depth and in breadth 
UNAMID is only likely to contribute to the causes of conflict, if the rebels are 
united and the political process results in a political agreement. In theory the 
CPA provides a solution for many of Sudan’s causes of conflict. If implemented 
it starts a process of political transformation and democratisation that also in 
Darfur may lead to further addressing of the causes of the conflict. It does, 
however, not provide in power and wealth sharing agreements for the conflicts 
in the North. It consequently does not address the problem of the 
marginalisation of Darfur. Worse, the CPA has legitimised the NCP as the 
political party in power in the North. By giving the NCP and the SPLM ratios 
in government positions, a mathematical power-sharing model, it has fossilized 
access to power and made power-sharing more difficult for the northern 
opposition. In addition, it has given the South the opportunity to secede, which, 
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if that would happen, places Darfur in a more unfavourable position to the 
NCP. As Darfur and other marginalized regions would no longer have a partner 
in the SPLM and the South, their position on the power balance would worsen. 
Moreover, the ecological causes of the conflict between the farmers and the 
nomads that determine the underlying conflict at a more local level cannot be 
addressed at a regional level. These are, however, highly important, as the most 
violent clashes have taken place in those areas where the ecological issue was 
most pressing. In addition, it is likely that, as in the case of UNMIS, UNAMID 
will face the perverse issue that peace for a large number of IDPs and especially 
refugees is in fact worse than war. The situation in many camps is better than in 
their places of origin, as sanitation, education and health services are present in 
the camps and often not in the places of origin. As a result, many IDPs are not 
likely to want to return and have already started to make their new homes more 
permanent. The DPA hopes to address some of these problems and causes, but 
thus far not up to the extent that most of the Darfurian rebels are willing to 
accept it. Without an inclusive political peace process for Darfur that leads to a 
peace agreement, it is not likely that any of the causes of the conflict will be 
addressed and UNAMID will probably not be able to do much more than 
addressing the consequences of the conflict. Unfortunately, presently the 
military and political processes are not interlinked and the mediators do not 
appear to have a solution for many of the causes.56 
The operation receives co-operation and support from important 
outside actors and parties 
Since 2004, cross-border operations by elements of the Chadian Army and the 
SAF, but also rebels from both countries, have been reported. Relations 
between both governments are presently cold, amongst other reasons because 
both governments support and arm the others rebel organisations. On 28 
November 2006 Chad declared itself in a state of war with Sudan over the 
latter’s support of Chadian rebels. Also in the CAR, the Khartoum regime has 
been accused to support the rebels. The signing of a peace agreement between 
the government of the CAR and various rebel groups on 28 January 2007 has, 
however, improved the security situation in that country. Both the governments 
of Chad and the CAR have agreed to the deployment of MINURCAT and 
EUFOR Chad/CAR and this is also likely to have a positive impact on security 
in Sudan. As a result the neighbouring countries are likely to support 
UNAMID.57 
 
With regard to the Security Council, its permanent members are not very likely 
to act strongly on Darfur. Russia remains a major supplier of weapons to the 
GoS, and China is a major consumer of Sudanese oil. Although China has 
become more active after the campaign over the ’genocide Olympics’, it is still 
not willing to increase the pressure further on Khartoum. The vocal position of 
both the US as the UK is merely hot air, because both countries have an 
interest in the NCP government as it is an ally in the war on terror. France 
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directs its attention to ‘la Francophonie’ and therefore has mainly interest in 
preventing further spill-over from Darfur. Although the international 
community is far from united, the Security Council was able in 2004 to decide 
in favour of a weak arms embargo and personal sanctions. It also supported the 
establishment of UNAMID, However, if UNAMID looses the support of the 
parties and the population, it may, like it did with AMIS, become less 
supportive.58 
 
The operation is deployed timely and at the right time 
The deployment of UNAMID does not take place at a ripe moment in the 
Darfur conflict. Such a possible moment passed when AMIS was deployed. At 
that time, the moment would have been ripe for an operation similar to 
UNAMID. Now, only if the political process is successful, the situation may 
become ripe again. It is, however, not likely that somebody in the establishment 
of the NCP dares to put his position at stake, like Taha did in case of the CPA. 
Nonetheless, it is hoped by the United Nations and the African Union that the 
deployment of the operation may contribute to the peace process, as the 
deployment may create its own dynamics, tilting the balance of power in favour 
of peace.59 
 
Although UNAMID was supposed to be operational by 1 January 2008, this 
date was no longer feasible due to three main reasons. First of all the GoNU is 
not helpful or even obstructive. It has not yet responded to the list of Troop 
Contributing Countries. It has furthermore slowed down deployment through 
tiresome visa and customs procedures, as well as through the slow release of 
land. It is, however, too easy for the United Nations to hide behind the 
unwillingness of the NCP. The United Nations itself is not capable of early 
deployment. This is, amongst other things, because of the second reason. The 
Troop Contributing Countries have thus far not provided the operation with 
the necessary troops assets and equipment, for example helicopters are still 
short. In addition, many of the pledged forces still need to be trained and 
equipped or are in this process. A third reason is that Darfur is an area where 
basic infrastructure is more or less absent. As a consequence, many of the 
logistical and information structures and capabilities of the operation could so 
far not be established. Camps still have to be build, water still has to be 
provided, etcetera. The engineers required to build the camps for the Heavy 
Support Package have still not finished and have not even been able to start for 
UNAMID. This is, amongst other reasons, because the contract with PAE is 
continued in 2008 by Dynacore, but the Dynacore personnel had at the end of 
2007 not yet received their visa. During the period from January to June 2008 
Dynacore is likely to be busy preparing for the further deployment of the Heavy 
Support Package This period, however, is also likely to be decisive for the speed 
of the deployment of UNAMID and its police force, because ideally during the 
same period the preparations for these units should also take place. 
© Clingendael Institute and Radboud University Nijmegen 33 
  
Nonetheless, in spite of all these obstructions and problems, it is likely that 
UNAMID will be able to deploy quicker than the two years period that was 
needed by UNMIS. UNMIS, at the time, did not have any logistical framework 
in Sudan. UNAMID can use the logistical facilities and networks of UNMIS. 
UNMIS has presently a network up and running from the harbour in Port 
Sudan to the airfields in Khartoum and El Genina and therefore this network 
does not need to be established anymore. Estimates on a realistic date for 
UNAMID to be operational range from 1 January 2009 to June 2009. 
Nonetheless, as a consequence of the delays, it is very likely that the only real 
difference between AMIS and UNAMID on 1 January 2008 has been the 
ceremony at which the AMIS personnel put on a different colour beret. The 
first early impact battalions are only likely to be deployed a few months later. 
These are, however, part of the heavy support package. As a result of the fact 
that UNAMID is only a ‘rehatted’ AMIS, the operation is not likely to be able 
to live up to the high expectations of the rebel parties and population and 
therefore it is likely to loose their willingness and cooperation.60 
The operation has at its disposal competent leadership and personnel, 
and clear command structures 
On paper UNAMID received, in accordance with the Addis Ababa Conclusions, 
unity of command and control. This means amongst others that the operation 
has one command structure and that these command and control structures 
and the backstopping is provided by the United Nations. This alone makes 
UNAMID likely to be more effective than AMIS.61 Nonetheless, already in his 
report the Secretary-General wrote: 
 
“bearing in mind that unity of command and control is a basic principle of 
peacekeeping, further clarity and agreement on the United Nations role in 
command and control will be required by United Nations troop- and 
police-contributing countries in order for them to provide personnel for the 
hybrid operation.”62 
 
According to the structures laid down for UNAMID in the report of the 
Secretary-General, UNAMID is led by the Joint African Union-United Nations 
Special Representative for Darfur, Rodolphe Adada of the Republic of Congo. 
He has the authority over the whole peacekeeping operation in Darfur, and has 
to oversee the implementation of the mandate. The Deputy Joint Special 
Representative Henry Anyidoho of Ghana is also appointed by both 
organizations. They have to report both to the Chairman of the African Union 
and the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Force Commander, 
general Martin Luther Agwai of Nigeria, and the Police Commissioner have 
been appointed by the African Union in consultation with the United Nations. 
Both have to report to the Joint Special Representative. The operational 
leadership is located within the integrated structures of the headquarters of the 
operation. Part of this headquarters is, amongst others structures, the support 
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division led by the United Nations Director of Administration. The Force 
Commander has command and control over the air support assets via the Joint 
Operations Centre and over the mission enablers via the Joint Logistics 
Operations Centre and the Chief, of Integrated Support Services. The overall 
management of the operation is according to the standards, principles and 
procedures of the United Nations. The AU and UN strategic headquarters of 
UNAMID is meant to consult effectively with the Joint Support Coordination 
Mechanism in Addis Ababa.63 Although on paper the command structure may 
become relatively clear, the Secretary-General warns: 
 
“The operation will be an unprecedented undertaking, which will pose 
significant challenges for both organizations, including the issue of unity 
and coherence of command.”64 
 
In fact in practice the command structure of a hybrid operation, like 
UNAMID, is inherently weak. Personnel at the United Nations Department of 
Peacekeeping operations has already made clear that for them this experiment is 
once and never again.65 
 
The political, military and police leadership of UNAMID is generally regarded 
to be better qualified than that of AMIS. At least, they made a good first 
impression and some argue they are top quality. However, the quality of the 
Force Commander has already been questioned, because he has been accused 
of appointing friends at higher positions. In addition, he has made promises to 
the rebel leaders with regard to their MSA, which he could not fulfil, and as a 
result he may already have lost credibility in their eyes. Moreover, after an 
initial positive start, he left for New York and left all the important issues to his 
deputy. The British Chief of Staff is, nevertheless, generally viewed to be 
excellent. Next to the operation, the political process suffers. It is harmed by its 
unprofessional approach and the fact that Salim Salim is unhappy in his role.66 
 
The quality of the military deployed in UNAMID is likely to suffer as a result of 
the demand of Khartoum that the force has to be predominantly African. It did 
so with the reason of making the operation as weak as possible. In practice 
UNAMID is likely to be AMIS forces to which more African infantry forces are 
added. The additional forces are, however, presently trained by western 
countries up to United Nations standards. The recruitment of qualified local 
civilian personnel in Darfur is likely to be less problematic than in UNMIS, 
because in Darfur a larger segment of the population is university educated. 
Also international staff is more likely to apply for this mission, because it is 
viewed as a CV-builder. Nonetheless, as half of the personnel of UNAMID is 
required to come from the African Union and half from the United Nations, it 
is likely to be problematic to find enough qualified African personnel for the 
higher positions, because they will have to meet United Nations criteria. It is 
rumoured that this is solved by hiring less-qualified personnel into higher 
positions and that more capable staff will have to work under less qualified 
heads. In addition all positions in UNAMID are scaled one position higher than 
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in UNMIS to ensure personnel can be found. Also, these recruitment issues are 
likely to cause delays.67 
The operation is part of a long term approach 
At present UNAMID is not part of a political process and it can also not 
implement either the DPA or any other peace process. Presently, it is therefore 
too early to say to what extent it is likely to be part of a long term approach. In 
absence of a political process, UNAMID will mainly be directed at addressing 
the short-term effects of the conflict. The operation can, however, still evolve. 
Within the operation and externally the different ‘policy instruments’ 
are coordinated 
Apart from the average cooperation and coordination issues a peacekeeping 
mission always has to deal with, UNAMID faces some extra challenges. First, 
UNAMID is specifically not an integrated mission. The country team, the 
developers and the humanitarians decided not to be associated with the 
operation out of fear for their own security. UNDP, for example, only wants 
coordination, not integration. At the same time the country team faces a huge 
organization that is also better paid. It is argued that if UNDP wants to discuss 
at the same level, it may have to increase the levels of payment of its staff. 
Second, UNAMID faces significant challenges in managing its own joint 
African Union and United Nations command structures as a hybrid operation. 
Already during the planning phase friction developed between the United 
Nations and the African Union. Representatives of the latter sometimes felt 
they were the underdog in the cooperation, unhappy with the ‘arrogant’ 
position of some of the United Nations staff. The least that can be said on this 
is that the United Nations staff was not very sensitive to it. The Joint 
Coordination Support Mechanism, for example, was meant to take decisions, 
but is presently only used for information exchange. The United Nations hopes 
to give it a liaison role, while the African Union hopes to make it more leading. 
In addition, the attitude within the United Nations is that it can largely dictate 
the rules of the game, since it also pays for it. As the Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General and the Force Commander are paid by the United 
Nations, they bow more to this organization. Furthermore, both organizations 
are also in transition and have their own goals and interests. The African Union 
is a relatively new organization in peacekeeping and still has to learn. The 
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operation is in a process of 
restructuring and the section which has to establish UNAMID is not spared 
from this. Third, Sudan is the first country where two peacekeeping operations 
are deployed simultaneously. These operations will have to coordinate their 
approaches on amongst others rule of law, elections and disarmament. On 
many of these issues it is very impracticable that UNAMID has a separate 
mandate from UNMIS. Fourth, UNAMID also will have to coordinate with 
MINURCAT and EUFOR Chad/CAR, two operations which are basically 
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deployed to address the same conflict only on a different side of the border. To 
give an example, disarmament in Darfur is related to disarmament in the rest of 
Sudan (UNMIS), but also in the whole region (MINURCAT). As arms flow to 
the disarmament process where most is received per handed-in weapon, a 
region wide policy is needed.68  
The operation provides ‘ownership’ 
It is too early to say whether UNAMID is likely to provide ‘ownership’. One 
can, however, say that this depends largely on the extent to which it is able to 
manage the expectations. With regard to the population, ‘ownership’ is likely to 
depend on the dissemination of information on the operation, the extent to 
which it is visible and effective, the extent to which it is regarded to be 
impartial, the extent to which it is able to win the hears and minds of the 
population by amongst others the implementation of QIPs, the extent to which 
it will be able to deploy early, et cetera. For the parties to obtain ‘ownership’ 
over UNAMID, they will have to reach an agreement. As already said, though, 
the outlooks are not very positive. Like AMIS, UNAMID is likely to be viewed 
as partisan by the rebels as everything has to be coordinated with the 
government. Especially in the short term, the rebel parties and the population 
are also not likely to see much of a difference with AMIS, because UNAMID is 
deployed late and with similar forces. If UNAMID does not show its teeth at an 
early stage, it is likely to fall into the same vicious circle AMIS was trapped in. 
The IDPs and the civilian population are then likely to have even less 
‘ownership’ over the operation and loose faith in it. At the same time, the 
government is Khartoum never wanted the operation in the first place, and is 
therefore not likely to feel any ownership over UNAMID either.69 
Operation is able to provide in an arms control regime 
The lack of arms control allowed Darfur to slide into anarchy. To a large extent 
much of the violence is presently banditry related. Without the rule of law, it 
will not be possible to address this sort of violence. At the same time due to the 
lack of trust amongst the parties, they view also banditry related violence as 
actions by their opponents. Also the Janjaweed is not likely to disarm without 
protection, out of fear for revenge. Moreover, as they are not only militia, but 
also nomads and cattle herders, they need their weapons as a means of survival. 
In short, there are too many arms in Darfur and the situation is too complex to 
disarm forcefully. A humanitarian intervention would not have been likely to 
succeed, but also the implementation of Security Council 1706 (2006) would 
not have been possible with a force of less than 100,000. Arms control is, 
however, again dependent on the implementation of a political process. 
Without a peace agreement that gives attention to this problem, UNAMID is 
likely to face large long-term problems.70 
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Concluding remarks 
If one reviews the factors for success and failure for UNAMID, there is little 
reason for optimism that it is likely to contribute to durable peace. The parties 
are not very willing and sincere. Moreover, the rebels are also too inexperienced 
and incapable and above all too splintered to negotiate. UNAMID is not part of 
a political process and in absence of such a process topped-off by a peace 
agreement, the operation can at best give attention to the consequences of the 
conflict, not to its causes. Whether this is likely to be done within the context of 
a long-term approach is too early to say, but is unlikely, because there is no 
political agreement and process. A process of arms control, for example, is not 
likely to be possible. From the start, the operation is likely to be tested on the 
extent to which it is willing and capable to act forcefully. If it does not 
immediately show its teeth, it is not likely to gain the respect of the parties and 
is unlikely to provide in a sense of security to the rebels, the Khartoum related 
militia, the civilian population and the IDPs. However, due to the obstruction 
of Khartoum, but just as much because of the incapability of the United 
Nations and the unwillingness of the Troop Contributing Countries, the 
operation is deployed late and likely to be only fully operational by June 2009. 
Initially, therefore, it is likely to be too weak. In addition, the deployment is not 
at a ripe moment for the resolution of the conflict, as it is either too late or too 
early. Although the neighbouring countries are supportive of the operation, the 
permanent members of the Security Council have not been very supportive of a 
strong mandate of UNAMID and willing to put pressure upon the parties. 
They all have to a certain extent interests in the NCP regime and are not likely 
to give it up. The quality of the force and the leadership is likely to be better 
than that of AMIS. However, its command structures are inherently weak due 
to its hybrid structure. Coordination problems between the United Nations and 
the African Union are inevitable. In addition, the operation is also likely to have 
enormous coordination problems with the rest of the United Nations system, 
with UNMIS, and the other peacekeeping operations on the other side of the 
border. As UNAMID is not likely to live-up to the high expectations, especially 
of the rebel organisations, the IDPs and the civilian population, these groups 
are likely to loose faith in it and are unlikely to ‘own’ its outcomes. UNAMID is 
thus not likely to be able to contribute to durable peace. At present this is also 
not primarily its mandate. Its main occupation is to provide a breathing space 
to the local population and the IDPs. 
 
With the present deployment of UNAMID the international community is 
fighting the war of 5 years ago. Presently the situation has changed drastically. 
One might therefore wonder whether the deployment of UNAMID is actually 
what is presently needed to address the problems in Darfur. However, the train 
of the international community has finally been set into motion. After a long 
period of pressure Khartoum has finally given in and allowed the deployment of 
UNAMID. How could the international community now decide that it is the 
wrong operation for the present day situation? It is therefore deployed in the 
hope that if the political process is back on track the force can be regarded as an 
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early presence. Moreover, as said, it may, if successful, provide a breathing 
space to the civilian population and the IDPs. On the other hand one has to 
keep in mind that if also the United Nations looses the support of the rebel 
parties and the population, no other organisation is likely to be able to do the 
job. One then has to hope that Darfur will not become another Somalia. 
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Policy recommendations 
As shown above the situations in the ‘North-South’ conflict and the Darfur 
conflict are very different. The main difference is the phase both conflicts are 
in. The ‘North-South’ conflict for the time being appears to be in a post-
conflict stage. Darfur is clearly still in conflict. UNMIS is therefore clearly a 
peacekeeping operation largely with the consent of the parties, acting under 
chapter six of the Charter, implementing a peace agreement. UNAMID for the 
time being is an operation deployed at a stage where there is no peace to keep, 
but where war is raging. The implementation of the DPA or any other peace 
agreement still requires more time before the conflict is ripe for resolution. This 
means either more negotiations or war. UNAMID is, however, deployed mainly 
to aid the protection of civilians and IDPs It has therefore much more a 
humanitarian task than monitoring and implementing a peace agreement. One 
might therefore argue that perhaps a lot of lessons can be learned from similar 
operations in different countries. Nonetheless from this study it appears that 
there are also many lessons to be learned from UNMIS and the geographical 
context for the case of UNAMID in Darfur. These lessons combined with the 
knowledge of the situation in Darfur lead to the following four clusters of 
recommendations where NGOs should lobby for, and what the United Nations 
and its member states should do to improve the peace operations in Sudan. 
General recommendations on Sudan and its peacekeeping operations 
• Bashing of the NCP does not aid both operations: The NCP needs to be on 
board of any solution for the conflicts in Sudan. In absence of any sort of 
leverage over the NCP, only bashing Khartoum is counterproductive. If 
international pressure is not backed by anything substantial, it is likely to 
further strengthen the hardliners. Entering into constructive talks with the 
NCP, on the other hand, provides insights in what drives who in Khartoum, 
in where to push and where to pull. In absence of such dialogue and 
continuously under attack, Khartoum is not likely to become more 
forthcoming. 
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• To aid both operations, more attention needs to be given to the CPA: The 
‘North-South’ peace process and the Darfur peace process are inherently 
connected. Without a successful CPA process, peace is not attainable in 
Darfur, while without peace in Darfur the implementation of the CPA is 
likely to suffer. At this moment international attention for Darfur is 
disproportionate, it draws away attention for the CPA and even influences 
NCP commitment to the CPA negatively. 
• Staff and others involved in both operations often needs to better understand the 
country and its conflicts: Sudan is a very complex country of which even its 
population, its government and its rebels do not fully understand all the 
processes and conflicts. Many donors are under the impression that they 
understand the situation, while in fact also they have no clue. One needs to 
be aware of this absence of knowledge and try to study the situation 
continuously. One has to be aware that every story is partisan and therefore 
only an opinion. This awareness should, however, not lead to inertia. 
• Both operations need to give attention to arms control instead of disarmament: To 
many inhabitants of Sudan weapons are a means of survival, a way to 
protect cattle and family. This means that militia and civilians cannot be 
disarmed without a policy of arms control. Consequently, civilian 
disarmament is an illusion in the short term, both in southern Sudan, as 
well as in Darfur, and therefore also in the case of the Janjaweed. 
• Both operations need to have more attention for QIPs: To win the hearts and 
minds of the population for UNAMID, UNMIS and the peace processes, 
more peace dividend is needed. Although it is impossible to develop Sudan 
in the blink of an eye, with QIPs the population can be shown that 
something is being done. 
• Both operations need to cooperate more with NGOs: NGOs lack information 
from UNMIS on what it does and they feel left out from their security and 
evacuation plans. Where possible this need to be more integrated in both 
UNMIS and UNAMID. 
• Both operations need more dissemination of information on the role of the 
peacekeeping operations: In order to prevent inflated expectations and to 
guarantee support from the population the United Nations need to make 
more clear what its role is and what it is doing. Otherwise it may easily loose 
the hearts and minds of the population.  
• Both operations need better quality of personnel: The United Nations needs to 
be enabled to offer qualified personnel better standards, so that they are 
more tempted to take a job in a mission. It needs to be prevented that less 
qualified personnel is hired in higher positions, as this is likely to have a 
negative impact on the operation. 
• Both operations need to have more flexible civilian recruitment: At present 
recruitment regulations are strict. Local staff is recruited on basis of 
education instead of experience, and only via the internet. Both rules are an 
obstacle for the recruitment of good personnel in areas where both 
infrastructure and education have been absent for a long time. In addition, 
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vacancies need to be made public before they are open to ensure that 
personnel can hand-over tasks in a proper and continuous manner. 
• In both operations the capacity of UNMOs need to be improved: UNMOs need 
more thorough pre-deployment training on the history and situation in the 
country and the conflict. In addition, longer tours need to be preferred, 
overlap between the presence of UNMOs in order for them to hand-over 
contacts and experiences is needed, and teams need to be send to the same 
locations to allow better establishment of contacts and understanding of the 
situation and the trends. 
• In both operations one needs to be more sensitive in where who is deployed: Not 
every contingent, UNMO or civilian personnel member is ideal for 
deployment in each area. Certain nationalities, ethnicities or religious 
backgrounds are less ideal for deployment in certain areas. For example 
Arabs or Muslims may be less welcome in the South, while Westerners may 
meet obstacles in parts of the North.  
Recommendations on UNMIS 
• UNMIS needs the establishment of a forum where the international community 
speaks and supports the operation with one voice: At present, as a result of 
opposing interests in the international political arena, the international 
community does not speak with one voice. As a consequence, the parties 
are not pushed further to implement certain parts of the CPA and also 
mediation opportunities are not picked-up. A forum or friends group may 
strengthen the role of the international community in assisting the parties 
towards peace. 
• UNMIS needs to provide more attention to the ‘South-South’ conflict: It is 
widely acknowledged that a violent ‘South-South’ conflict is very likely. 
Presently UNMIS does not give much attention to this potential, as it 
argues the tribal conflicts are not part of its mandate. The prevention of this 
conflict, however, needs to be interpreted as part of the UNMIS mandate, 
because not only is it likely to have an impact upon the ‘North-South’ 
conflict, but also in the past that conflict has been fought-out by the use of 
the ‘South-South’ conflict. 
• Donors need to fund the quick start of a reintegration process of ex-combatants: 
The DDR-process in the South, needs a pull factor to give the process its 
own dynamics. Although the SPLA does want to downsize its army, it can 
only do so if its personnel is provided with an alternative that is more 
attractive than the army. For this reason, donors need to provide funds for 
the necessary reintegration of ex-combatants. 
• UNMIS needs more air assets: To enable UNMIS, country team and NGO 
staff to make the necessary movements in Sudan, the Military Component 
need to be provided with more air assets. 
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Recommendations for UNAMID 
• The UNAMID mandate needs to be robustly implemented: UNAMID is likely 
to be immediately tested by the local parties. It is of crucial importance that 
the operation shows teeth from the start. If it does not, it is likely to become 
a plaything of the parties, and loose faith of the parties and the population. 
• UNAMID needs to be quickly deployed: Slow deployment is likely to have a 
negative effect upon the perception of UNAMID amongst the conflicting 
parties and the population. It is hard to change a first impression. If this 
first impression is a weak or non-present operation, an operation that is no 
different from AMIS, it is likely to be difficult to repair this image. 
• UNAMID needs to patrol actively: UNAMID needs to show its presence. It 
needs to actively patrol its areas of deployment, to provide the population in 
a sense of security and to show the conflicting parties that it is not to be 
played with. In this way, it can also win the hearts and minds of the 
population and as such gain information from them. 
• UNAMID needs to actively use field diplomacy: In absence of a real 
understanding of the situation on the ground and without knowledge on 
who are really in power and who are not, it is necessary to lay contact with 
the local population. By drinking tea one can learn to understand the 
situation on the ground. This needs to be done by both the UN military as 
well as a large Civil Affairs Component and needs to be linked to the overall 
political process. For this purpose one does, however, need Arab speaking 
interpreters. 
• UNAMID needs a large civil affairs division: To establish contact with the 
population, to mediate their differences and conflicts, and to aid a 
reconciliation process, a larger civilian affairs division is needed. 
• UNAMID needs to address attention to the use of traditional power structures and 
conflict resolution instruments: Although the conflict has sincerely harmed 
traditional power structures by giving power to the armed and young, and 
consequently destroyed traditional ways of conflict resolution, it is 
important to support and rebuild the old power structures as a counter 
balance to the power of the gun. These structures and instruments may 
assist in arms control and conflict resolution, amongst others in the field of 
the ecological conflict. 
• The deployment of UNAMID needs to be more focused: An integrated operation 
is not necessarily a large operation. UNMIS shows that overlap can also 
have negative consequences. An operation in which the country team is 
more integrated may be smaller in the end. Moreover, one may wonder to 
what extent each part of UNAMID is necessary in Darfur. For example, the 
role of the Elections and Rule of Law Units is not yet clear. Blue prints 
from other operations are not necessarily the right solution for Darfur. The 
operation needs to start from the needs on the ground.  
• UNAMID needs to stimulate the Darfur-Darfur dialogue: The rebel parties are 
presently too splintered to make a peace process viable. Without the 
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unification and professionalisation of the rebels any political process is likely 
to fail. 
Recommendations for a future peace-building operation and peace 
process in Darfur 
• A future peace-building operation in Darfur needs a robust mandate: The parties 
to the CPA wanted to have a peace operation with a weak mandate. 
Consequently UNMIS has not been able to push the parties forward when 
needed. Except for monitoring non-implementation, UNMIS is not able to 
penalize parties that do not stick to the agreement. A future peace 
agreement in Darfur needs to provide more powers to the operation in 
order to keep the parties on track. This does not only mean that the military 
force needs to consist of more non- African forces, but also the civil 
implementation needs to be potentially tougher. 
• A future peace-building operation in Darfur needs a continuous mediation role: 
No peace process ends with the signing of a peace agreement. Within a 
future peace agreement a continuous mediation role or follow-up 
mechanism needs to be provided for, either by an institution acceptable to 
both parties, or by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. 
Moreover, the mediators of the agreement need to commit themselves to 
the implementation of the agreement. 
• The peace process in Darfur needs an inclusive approach: In this context it is not 
so much necessary to include all the minor rebel factions, the most 
important factions will do. However, it is necessary to include into the 
process the large Arab tribes in Darfur. Not only are they now wrongly 
perceived to be equal to the Janjaweed, but also they have stakes. In 
addition, to end the conflict, also the Janjaweed may have to be invited to 
the negotiations table. 
• The peace process in Darfur needs durable solutions for IDPs: In the ‘North-
South’ conflict many IDPs have become part of an urbanization process. 
They are no longer interested in returning to their places of origin as the 
places where they are presently living, are more convenient. In their places 
of origin education, sanitation, health, et cetera are often absent, while their 
present living conditions are much better. This is also likely to be the case 
for many IDPs in Darfur. Many are not likely to want to return to their 
villages and have already established more or less permanent alternatives. 
As it is often not obtainable to provide the same services IDPs presently 
receive in many camps in their places of origin, one will have to anticipate 
and consider how to manage this ‘urbanization process’. 
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Executive summary 
Chances of success and failure for UNMIS 
At present a look at the factors for success and failure gives a mixed picture of 
UNMIS. Since the death of Garang the parties are only willing and sincere to 
cooperate with UNMIS to the extent that they view its implementation of the 
CPA in their own advantage. It is too weak to provide the parties in a real sense 
of security, but its presence is very relevant as a guarantee that the parties will 
not violate the agreement too much. Some of the causes of the conflict are 
partly addressed by UNMIS, but the extent to which the democratisation will 
take place and the power and wealth sharing will become nationwide, depends 
on the parties themselves. The international community in the meantime has 
largely lost interest in CPA implementation and turned to Darfur. It even used 
UNMIS and CPA implementation as a trade-off for the involvement and 
deployment of the United Nations in Darfur. Moreover, none of the permanent 
members of the Security Council is sincerely interested and willing to offend 
the NCP. Although the United Nations was involved at an early stage in the 
peace process and was even able to deploy the advance mission UNAMIS, both 
parties were not willing to fully cooperate. Due to successful dragging by 
Khartoum, it took until well into 2007, two years after the signing of the CPA, 
before UNMIS was finally fully deployed. The operation suffered further as a 
result of the fact that its leadership, Pronk, was declared persona non grata and 
was forced to leave. Consequently, the mission was left headless for one year, 
which in turn influenced its coordination. The quality of its personnel is mixed. 
The extent to which the UNMIS is part of a long term approach differs per 
‘policy instrument’. On some issues the ‘policy instruments’ are part of a 
broader approach, while one may question the sustainability of others. 
Although within the context of the concept of the integrated operation, a lot 
attention has been given to coordination, in practise duplication, overlap, 
stovepiping and organisational infighting have been frequent. Nonetheless, the 
parties fully own CPA implementation and as such UNMIS. The population is, 
however, much less aware of what they may and may not expect from UNMIS 
and the CPA. Civilian disarmament, which is not part of UNMIS’ mandate, is 
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likely to be an enormous future task especially because the conditions for arms 
control are not yet present.  
The probability that a peacekeeping operation contributes to durable peace 
increases if the extent to which it fulfils the factors for success and failure 
increases. In its performance UNMIS is not very different from an average 
relatively successful peacekeeping operation. Often operations face tough issues 
similar to the ‘troubles’ in Sudan. Even operations which in the end contribute 
successfully to durable peace often face and overcome similar problems. The 
extent to which the most successful operations thus far fulfilled the factors for 
success and failure was often not much different. Many unsuccessful operations 
have performed much worse. As such, however, like any relatively successful 
operation UNMIS’ quest stands upon the edge of a knife. Stray but a little and 
it will fail. Hope remains, however, as also a relative successful operation is a 
walk over the tightrope. 
Chances of success and failure for UNAMID 
If one reviews the factors for success and failure for UNAMID, there is little 
reason for optimism that it is likely to contribute to durable peace. The parties 
are not very willing and sincere. Moreover, the rebels are also too inexperienced 
and incapable and above all too splintered to negotiate. UNAMID is not part of 
a political process and in absence of such a process topped-off by a peace 
agreement, the operation can at best give attention to the consequences of the 
conflict, not to its causes. Whether this is likely to be done within the context of 
a long-term approach is too early to say, but is unlikely, because there is no 
political agreement and process. A process of arms control, for example, is not 
likely to be possible. From the start, the operation is likely to be tested on the 
extent to which it is willing and capable to act forcefully. If it does not 
immediately show its teeth, it is not likely to gain the respect of the parties and 
is unlikely to provide in a sense of security to the rebels, the Khartoum related 
militia, the civilian population and the IDPs. However, due to the obstruction 
of Khartoum, but just as much because of the incapability of the United 
Nations and the unwillingness of the Troop Contributing Countries, the 
operation is deployed late and likely to be only fully operational by June 2009. 
Initially, therefore, it is likely to be too weak. In addition, the deployment is not 
at a ripe moment for the resolution of the conflict, it is either too late or too 
early. Although the neighbouring countries are supportive of the operation, the 
permanent members of the Security Council have not been very supportive of a 
strong mandate of UNAMID and willing to put pressure upon the parties. 
They all have to a certain extent interests in the NCP regime and are not likely 
to give it up. The quality of the force and the leadership is likely to be better 
than that of AMIS. However, its command structures are inherently weak due 
to its hybrid structure. Coordination problems between the United Nations and 
the African Union are inevitable. In addition, the operation is also likely to have 
enormous coordination problems with the rest of the United Nations system, 
with UNMIS, and the other peacekeeping operations on the other side of the 
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border. As UNAMID is not likely to live-up to the high expectations, especially 
of the rebel organisations, the IDPs and the civilian population, these groups 
are likely to loose faith in it and are unlikely to ‘own’ its outcomes. UNAMID is 
thus not likely to be able to contribute to durable peace. At present this is also 
not primarily its mandate. Its main occupation is to provide a breathing space 
to the local population and the IDPs. 
 
With the present deployment of UNAMID the international community is 
fighting the war of 5 years ago. Presently the situation has changed drastically. 
One might therefore wonder whether the deployment of UNAMID is actually 
what is presently needed to address the problems in Darfur. However, the train 
of the international community has finally been set into motion. After a long 
period of pressure Khartoum has finally given in and allowed the deployment of 
UNAMID. How could the international community now decide that it is the 
wrong operation for the present day situation? It is therefore deployed in the 
hope that if the political process is back on track the force can be regarded as an 
early presence. Moreover, as said, it may, if successful, provide a breathing 
space to the civilian population and the IDPs. On the other hand one has to 
keep in mind that if also the United Nations looses the support of the rebel 
parties and the population, no other organisation is likely to be able to do the 
job. One then has to hope that Darfur will not become another Somalia. 
Lessons and recommendations 
The situations in the ‘North-South’ conflict and the Darfur conflict are very 
different. The main difference is the phase both conflicts are in. The ‘North-
South’ conflict for the time being appears to be in a post-conflict stage. Darfur 
is clearly still in conflict. UNMIS is therefore clearly a peacekeeping operation 
largely with the consent of the parties, acting under chapter six of the Charter, 
implementing a peace agreement. UNAMID for the time being is an operation 
deployed at a stage where there is no peace to keep, but where war is raging. 
The implementation of the DPA or any other peace agreement still requires 
more time before the conflict is ripe for resolution. This means either more 
negotiations or war. UNAMID is, however, deployed mainly to aid the 
protection of civilians and IDPs. It therefore has much more a humanitarian 
task than monitoring and implementing a peace agreement. One might 
therefore argue that perhaps a lot of lessons can be learned from similar 
operations in different countries. Nonetheless from this study it appears that 
there are also many lessons to be learned from UNMIS and the geographical 
context for the case of UNAMID in Darfur. These lessons combined with the 
knowledge of the situation in Darfur lead to the following four clusters of 
recommendations where NGOs should lobby for, and what the United Nations 
and its member states should do to improve the peace operations in Sudan. 
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General recommendations on Sudan and its peacekeeping operations 
• Bashing of the NCP does not aid both operations. 
• To aid both operations, more attention needs to be given to the CPA. 
• Staff and others involved in both operations often need to better understand 
the country and its conflicts. 
• Both operations need to give attention to arms control instead of 
disarmament. 
• Both operations need to have more attention for QIPs. 
• Both operations need to cooperate more with NGOs. 
• Both operations need more dissemination of information on the role of the 
peacekeeping operations. 
• Both operations need better quality of personnel. 
• Both operations need to have more flexible civilian recruitment. 
• In both operations the capacity of UNMOs needs to be improved. 
• In both operations one needs to be more sensitive in where who is deployed. 
Recommendations on UNMIS 
• UNMIS needs the establishment of a forum where the international 
community speaks and supports the operation with one voice. 
• UNMIS needs to provide more attention to the ‘South-South’ conflict. 
• Donors need to fund the quick start of a reintegration process of ex-
combatants. 
• UNMIS needs more air assets. 
Recommendations for UNAMID 
• The UNAMID mandate needs to be robustly implemented. 
• UNAMID needs to be quickly deployed. 
• UNAMID needs to patrol actively. 
• UNAMID needs to actively use field diplomacy. 
• UNAMID needs a large civil affairs division. 
• UNAMID needs to address attention to the use of traditional power 
structures and conflict resolution instruments. 
• The deployment of UNAMID needs to be more focused. 
• UNAMID needs to stimulate the Darfur-Darfur dialogue. 
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Recommendations for a future peace-building operation and peace 
process in Darfur 
• A future peace-building operation in Darfur needs a robust mandate. 
• A future peace-building operation in Darfur needs a continuous mediation 
role. 
• The peace process in Darfur needs an inclusive approach. 
• The peace process in Darfur needs durable solutions for IDPs. 
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